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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the dynamic impacts of cotton marketing reforms on farm output in rural Zambia.
Following liberalization and the elimination of the Zambian cotton marketing board, the sector developed
an outgrower scheme whereby cotton firms provided credit, access to inputs and output markets, and
technical assistance to the farmers. There are two distinctive phases of the reforms: a failure of the
outgrower contracts, due to farmers' debt renegation, firm hold up, and lack of coordination among
firms and farms, and a subsequent period of success of the scheme, due to enhanced contract enforcement
and commitment. We find interesting dynamics in the sector. During the phase of failure, farmers
were pushed back into subsistence and cotton yields per hectare declined. With the improvement of
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In Africa, commodity markets were traditionally controlled by marketing boards|parastatal
organizations that connected domestic farmers with product and input markets. Many of
these public marketing boards|a bequeathal of British and French colonies|were eliminated
during the agricultural liberalization of the 1990s.1 The Zambian cotton sector is a good
example of this type of reforms. Until 1994, a public marketing agency, Lintco (Lint
Company of Zambia), controlled the sector by selling inputs, buying cotton, giving credit,
and facilitating access to technology, equipment and know-how. Lintco enjoyed monopsony
power in purchases of farm output and monopoly power in sales of inputs. In 1994, the
sector was liberalized and Lintco was privatized. Initially, the entry of Lonrho and Clark
Cotton gave rise to a phase of regional private monopolies. During this phase, the rms
developed outgrower schemes, vertical arrangements between rms and farmers whereby
cotton ginners provided inputs on loans that were repaid at harvest time. In 1999, as
additional entry and competition ensued, the outgrower scheme began to fail due to side
selling of cotton seeds|farmers would take loans from one rm while selling to another.
This caused a vicious circle: higher default rates led to higher costs to the companies,
which in turn led to higher input prices and lower protability for non-defaulting farmers.
As a result, the scheme collapsed.2 The situation improved around 2001, when Dunavant
(which had bought Lonrho) and Clark perfected the outgrower schemes to allow for tighter
enforcement of contracts.3
In this paper, we investigate the dynamic eects of these marketing reforms on cotton
yields at the farm level in rural Zambia. The outgrower schemes are a manifestation of
the typical interlocking of transactions that constitutes a key element of the institutional
framework that governs markets in developing countries (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). In
1See Bates (1981) for a comprehensive discussion of the politics of marketing boards in Africa. These
marketing agencies set prices below world prices and utilized the revenue to improve the performance of
the agricultural sector. After independence, the boards lost their role as support to agriculture and became
highly inecient institutions for redistribution and political gain.
2Kranton and Swamy (2008) develop a model where farmers can renege debt and side-sell and rms can
hold up the farmers via lower ex-post prices.
3See Section 2 for details of the reforms.Zambia, the outgrower schemes facilitated the enforcement of farm contracts and the
development of input, output and credit markets for the farmers. Given the available data
and the changes in market structure in cotton, we are in a unique position to generate
evidence on the role of contract enforcement, interlocked markets, and market structure
(competition) on farm output and market choices.
We use farm surveys, the Post Harvest Surveys (PHS) of the Zambian Central Statistical
Oce. These surveys are repeated cross-sections of farmers with information on land
allocation, yields, input use, and household characteristics. Our identication strategy relies
on the comparison of cotton yields (relative to aggregate agricultural trends) across dierent
phases of the reforms, conditional on both observed covariates (such as land, assets, farm and
demographic characteristics) and unobserved farm eects such as overall land quality and
overall cropping ability. In addition, we account for any biases caused by the compositional
eects associated with entry and exit into cotton farming.4 Since more productive cotton
farmers are more likely to allocate a larger fraction of their land to cotton production, we
can use cotton shares, purged of observed covariates, as a proxy for the unobserved cotton
eects that drive entry and exit (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1987; Pitt et al., 1990).
The available data from the Post Harvest Survey span the period 1997-2002. While this
prevents us from assessing the direct short-run impacts of the privatization of Lintco in 1994,
we can explore the eects of the market dynamics that typically unravel after privatization,
namely the heavy restructuring of the sector via entry and exit, the development of various
outgrower schemes, and other factors.5 This paper is therefore not about the short-run
benets and costs of agriculture privatization in Africa, but rather about the medium-run
impacts of the changes in market structure and contract enforcement mechanisms. Indeed,
4These compositional eects have been studied in the industrial productivity literature (Olley and Pakes,
1996; Pavcnik, 2002). In cotton farming, the composition bias appears if, for instance, lower productivity
farmers exit during the failure phase. In this case, the average yield conditional on pre-reform cotton
participation is lower than the average yield conditional on post-reform participation. Left unaccounted,
this dierence leads to a downward bias in the estimated impacts of the reforms (that is, to lower estimated
losses in yields). During the success phase, entry of low productivity farmers may lead to lower estimated
gains.
5This type of follow-up dynamics after liberalization are not specic to the Zambian case. They have
been also observed in cashews in Mozambique (Welch et al., 2003), tobacco in Tanzania, coee in Uganda,
among other experiences.our ndings reveal that, during the collapse of the outgrower contracts in 1999 and 2000,
cotton adoption decreased and farm yields declined by between 40 to 45%. In contrast, the
subsequent success in the outgrower schemes induced farmers to increase land allocations to
cotton, and caused yields per hectare to increase by 18%.
The large impacts on cotton yields that we estimate in this paper attest to the relevance
of grass-root level institutions that facilitate market interactions (Greif, 1993). Our analysis
provides valuable lessons on the role of contracts, and mechanisms to enforce them, for
development. In places where the judicial system does not work eciently, well-functioning
outgrower schemes are a viable alternative. Good outgrower schemes, in turn, depend on
the balance between cooperation and competition among rms (Banerjee and Duo, 2000;
Kranton and Swamy, 2008). More competition is a pre-requisite for eciency in market
interlinkages between rms and farmers, but excessive or unregulated entry can lead to
failures in contract enforcement.
Our work is also related to the literature on the modernization of agricultural value
chains in developing countries. For instance, Gow and Swinnen (2001), Dries and Swinnen
(2004), and Maertens and Swinnen (2009), among many others, study similar mechanisms to
enforce contracts in transition economies (Slovakia, Croatia, Poland) and Africa (Senegal).
Finally, our ndings have implications for household income and poverty, critical issues in
rural Zambia|where poverty rates exceed 80% of the population (Balat and Porto, 2006).
Since yields per hectare more than doubled after the success of the outgrower contracts,
sizeable drops in poverty should be expected (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the main
reforms in cotton markets and the main expected impacts on yields. In section 3, we
introduce the Post Harvest data and we describe our empirical model of crop choices and
farm output. In Section 4, we discuss the results and assess the impacts of the marketing
reforms on average farm yields. Section 5 concludes.2 The Zambian Cotton Reforms
With a population of 10.7 million and a per capita GDP of only 302 US dollars, Zambia is
one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1998, for instance, the national poverty rate was
69.6%, with rural poverty at 82.1% and urban poverty at 53.4%. Given the characteristics
of the soil, cotton can only be grown in three Zambian provinces, the Eastern, Central, and
Southern provinces. Where it is grown, cotton is a major source of income. Data from
the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey of 1998 reveal that the share of cotton in income
was 8.4% in the Central province, 9.5% in the Eastern province, and 2.8% in the Southern
province.
Zambia began a process of economy-wide reforms in 1991. Based on Tschirley and Kabwe
(2007) and Tschirley et al. (2009), we focus here on the elimination of the cotton marketing
board. Traditionally, the Zambian cotton sector was heavily regulated. From 1977 to 1994,
cotton marketing was controlled by the Lint Company of Zambia (Lintco), a parastatal
organization. Lintco set the sale prices of certied cotton seeds, pesticides, and sprayers, as
well as the purchase price of cotton lint. Lintco had monopsony power in cotton purchases
and monopoly power in inputs sales and credit loans to farmers.
In 1994, Lintco was sold to Lonrho and Clark Cotton|rms with regional interests in
cotton. The privatization was done in a way that facilitated the geographical segmentation
of the market, with Lonrho active in the Center and Clark in the East. As a result, the
initial phase of liberalization gave rise to geographical monopsonies rather than national
oligopsonies.
At that moment, Lonrho and Clark Cotton developed outgrower schemes with Zambian
farmers. In these outgrower programs, rms provided seeds and inputs on loans, together
with extension services to improve productivity. The value of the loan was deducted from the
sales of cotton seeds to the ginners at picking time. These schemes were based on \agents,"
rm employees that acted as extension and credit ocers. Supposedly, the pass-through of
international prices to the farmer was enhanced. Initially, repayment rates were high (around
roughly 86%) and cotton production signicantly increased. We called this the outgrower
introductory phase.By 1999, the expansion of cotton farming attracted new entrants in ginning and assembly.
Instead of the localized monopsonies, competition ensued. Furthermore, independent cotton
intermediaries emerged. These traders (who acquired inputs independently, distributed them
to various farmers, purchased cotton lint, and sold it to the ginneries) made competition even
more aggressive. Without any regulatory framework to control entry, the system entered a
vicious circle and failed. Those rms that were not using outgrower schemes as well as
some cotton intermediaries had incentives to oer higher net cotton prices to farmers who
had already signed outgrower contracts with other rms (mostly Lonrho and Clark). This
caused repayment problems and increased the rate of loan defaults. The loan repayment rate,
for instance, dropped to around 60-65%. In turn, rms raised loan prices and non-defaulting
farmers ended up receiving a lower net price for their cotton production. The sector collapsed.
We called this the outgrower scheme failure phase.
Partly as a result of this failure of the outgrower schemes, Lonrho exited the market
and was acquired by Dunavant Zambia Limited (part of a U.S. multinational corporation).
Dunavant and Clark Cotton actively worked to improve and expand the outgrower schemes.6
Two innovations took place. First, rms adopted identifying labels on the cotton bags given
to farmers to store production after harvest and committed to only purchase cotton bags with
their own labels. This helped eliminate most of the independent traders that contaminated
the market during the failure phase. Second, Dunavant introduced the \Distributor System."
The rm provided inputs which were allocated to farmers by a distributor, an independent
agent (not a rm employee), that grew cotton himself. He prepared individual contracts with
the farmers, was in charge of assessing reasons for loan defaults (being able, in principle,
of condoning default in special cases), and renegotiated contracts in incoming seasons. The
Distributor had discretion on the number of farmers under his control. Clark kept the more
traditional agent/employee-based system but worked to extend coverage. Both Dunavant
and Clark (and others) also expanded the production network, thus facilitating access for a
wider array of smallholders. Both systems worked well, and repayment rates increased from
6Some of the other minor players that had recently entered the market also used outgrower schemes,
although they arguably free-rode on the schemes successfully developed by the major players, Dunavant
(Lonrho) and Clark.65% to 90% (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2007). The sector boosted. We call this the outgrower
scheme success phase.
3 Data and Estimation Strategy
In this section, we describe the data and we develop the empirical model to estimate the
dynamic impacts of the dierent phases of the cotton marketing reforms on cotton yields.
3.1 The Post Harvest Survey
We use the Post Harvest Survey (PHS), farm surveys collected by the Zambian Central
Statistical Oce (CSO). We have annual repeated cross-sectional data available for the
period 1997-2002. The survey is representative at the national level, but in this paper we
only use the data pertaining to cotton producing regions: the Central, Eastern, Southern
and Lusaka provinces. The PHS gathers information on land tenure, land usage (allocation),
output in physical units, household characteristics (demographics, housing infrastructure),
and limited data on farm assets and inputs.
Table 1 provides an overview of the relevant sample sizes, by year and by province.
In a given survey, around 600-700 households were interviewed in the Central province,
1,200, in the Eastern province, 800 in the Southern province, and 200 in Lusaka. Table 2,
which reports the fraction of farmers engaged in cotton production, conrms that the major
cotton producing areas are indeed the Eastern province (where, for example, 39% of farmers
produced cotton in 2002), the Central province (20%), and the Southern province (12.8%).
There were some, but not many, cotton producers in Lusaka and, in the remaining provinces,
the percentage of households that grow cotton was virtually zero.
Table 2 also reveals some of the interesting dynamic patterns that we explore below.
During 1997 and 1998, the introductory phase, cotton participation was relatively stable
in all provinces (although a declining pattern may be discernible). The failure phase
(1999-2000) shows lower participation rates, particularly in 2000. In the Central province, for
instance, cotton participation dropped from 22.6% in 1998 to 10.3%. Similarly, participationdeclined from 32.7 to 20.4 percent in the Eastern province, from 10.7% to 4.3% in the
Southern provinces, and from 3.3% to 0.4% in Lusaka. The success phase (2001-2002)
instead correlated with strong entry into cotton: the percentage of cotton growers increased
signicantly in all provinces: from 10.3 to 20.2% in the Central province, from 20.4 to 39%
in the Eastern province, from 4.3 to 12.8% in the Southern province, and from 0.4 to 8.2%
in Lusaka.
Similar conclusions emerge from the inspection of the intensity of participation. In Table
3, we report data on the fraction of land allocated to cotton, for all farmers (panel a) and
for cotton farmers (panel b). We conrm the prevalence of cotton in the Eastern province
(with an average land share of 14.6 percent in 2002), in the Central province (8.5%), and in
the Southern province (5.1%). In panel b), notice that, conditional on cotton farming, the
average share of land allocated to cotton is relatively similar across regions: 37.3% in the
East, 39.1% in the Center, and 38.9% in the South. The dynamics of cotton adoption are
also revealed in Table 3. The fraction of land allocated to cotton sharply declined in 1999
and 2000 (the failure phase) and then increased in 2001 and 2002 (the success phase).
In Table 4, we report the evolution of cotton yields per hectare, the focus of our
investigation. The gures are in logarithms, so that changes from one year to the other
can be interpreted as growth rates. At the national level, cotton yields increased from 1997
to 1998, and then declined during the failure phase of 1999-2000. In fact, yields dropped by
32% from 1998 to 2000 (although average yields in 2000 were comparable to average yields
in 1997). During the success phase, average yields signicantly recovered.
3.2 The Empirical Model
To estimate the impacts of the reforms on cotton yields, we let yc
ht denote the volume of
cotton production per hectare (in kilograms) produced by household h in period t. The log









t + It + ht + 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c
ht; (1)where xc
ht is a vector of observed controls, F1 and F2 capture the dierent phases of the
marketing reforms, It are year eects, and ht, ht and ht are dierent farm eects that
comprise the error term. We rst discuss the model, equation (1), and we then explain our
identication strategy.
In (1), xc
ht is a vector of household determinants of cotton yields: age and gender of the
household head, household size and household demographics, general farm and household
characteristics (male composition, aggregate fertilizer use), assets, the size of the land
allocated to cotton, farm size, and district dummies.7 We also include prices, exploring
models with the international price of cotton relative to the district maize price and the
pre-planting cotton price (relative to maize prices).
We measure the impacts of the marketing reforms with two variables, F 1
t and F 2
t . F 1
t is a
dummy variable that captures the second period of the reform, the outgrower scheme failure
phase of 1999-2000, and F 2
t is another dummy that captures the third period of the reform,
the outgrower scheme success phase of 2001-2002. The impacts of these phases of the reform
are measured relative to the excluded category, which is the outgrower scheme introductory
phase of 1997-1998. It is important to note that the introductory phase already showed
signicant improvements in performance vis- a-vis the marketing board era (Tschirley and
Kabwe, 2007). Since the introductory phase is our base period, our estimates are a lower
bound for the impacts of the privatization.
The variables F1 and F2 are aggregate indicators of the dierent phases of the reforms
and therefore include several mechanisms through which these marketing reforms aect
yields: input prices, output prices, and access to credit, improved inputs (sprayers, seeds,
equipment), and technology. Yields are aected for two main reasons. First, the reforms
aect input use like labor, seeds and pesticides and, especially, input quality and eort
(farmers may neglect the crop during the failure phase and, conversely, exert more eort and
7Briey, the determinants of cotton yields include: the quantity and quality of variable inputs; human
capital; the use of credit and the availability of collateral (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Dercon, 1996);
technology (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry, 2010); the use of improved tools (tractors or
sprayers); local infrastructure and public goods; agricultural extension services; social capital and learning
externalities; the trade-o between protability and risk (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993) and the dierent
attitudes towards risks (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; Dercon, 1996); missing food markets (de Janvry et
al., 1991; Fafchamps, 1992; Jayne, 1994).secure higher quality inputs during the success phase). Second, yields are aected because
of the improved eciency in input combination allowed for by enhanced access to credit,
technology, and information. In (1), 1 and 2 capture a mixture of all these eects|price,
credit, input use, information, and eciency. Due to the nature of our data, we can assess the
overall signicance of all these factors, but we are unable to separately identify the relative
importance of each of the components.
We now turn to a discussion of our identication strategy. Since we measure the dierent
phases of the reforms with combinations of year dummies, identication of 1 and 2 requires
that we control for the year eects It. These eects capture aggregate agricultural eects
and other shocks that are common to all farmers in a given period t and that may confound
the impacts of the reforms.
Further, identication of 1 and 2 also requires a discussion of the unobserved
heterogeneity in the model. This includes regional eects, like market access, local
infrastructure, and local knowledge, which can be controlled for with district dummies. More
importantly, the unobserved heterogeneity includes three dierent idiosyncratic farm level
unobservables: a farm eect, , a cotton-specic eect, , and a random shock . The farm
eect  captures all idiosyncratic factors aecting general agricultural productivity in farm h
that are observed by the farmer when making input and land allocation decisions but not by
the econometrician (and thus are not included in x). For instance, land quality, know-how,
and other factors that aect yields in all crops are components of . The cotton-specic eect
 is a combination of unobserved factors that aect yields in cotton, including ability and
expertise in cotton husbandry and suitability of the land for cotton farming. Finally, since
the random shock  is unobserved by the farmer, it does not aect the farmers' decisions;
unlike  and ,  can be left unaccounted for.
There are two problems with the household eects  and . First, some of the variables
in x as well as the reform variables F1 and F2, which include factors such as eort, input
use (quality of seeds), or technical advice, may be correlated with  and . For example,
farmers with more farming ability may focus more on the details of cotton production and
exert better eort or apply more and better fertilizer to the cotton crop; or, they could seekhigher quality, more regular technical assistance. Second, entry and exit into cotton farming
depend on  since farmers' decisions on land allocation may be based on factors like land
quality or farmer ability. This entry/exit component can aect the estimates of the reform
dummies by altering the composition of farmers that produce cotton in each time period
(see below).8
To account for this unobserved heterogeneity, we need additional modeling. Our empirical
approach embeds two strategies: we use trends in maize yields to control for both the overall
agricultural eects, It, and the overall farm eects, ; and we use the share of land devoted
to cotton to control for cotton-specic eects, .
3.2.1 Trends in Maize Yields
Our rst strategy is to dierence out the eects of time-varying aggregate eects in
agriculture, It, and idiosyncratic farm eects, ht, using a model of maize yields. To
implement it, we assume that yields per hectare in maize, ym
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m
ht: (2)
Here, maize yields depends on covariates xm
ht (which include regional eects), the agricultural
year eects, It, and the farm eects ht. In (2), we assume that all the maize-specic
eects are accounted for by It and ht, a reasonable assumption since Zambian farmers have











t + ht + ht: (3)
In (3), the vector xht is the same as in (1). Moreover, it also includes the relative price
of cotton to maize at the district level and regional dummies, which are not cancelled out
in the dierencing because we allow the regional eects to aect cotton and maize yields
dierently. For example, to the extent that the district dummies capture local market access
8If these idiosyncratic eects were xed over time, panel data would allow us to account for both  and
 with farm xed eects. The Post Harvest Survey, however, is a repeated cross section of farmers and thus
both  and  are indexed by h and t.eects, we allow marketing conditions to aect cotton (a cash crop activity) and maize (a
mostly subsistence crop) dierently.
The maize-dierencing strategy requires that all cotton producers be maize producers
as well. In the case of Zambia, we claim that this strategy works because maize is the
major staple crop and is thus produced by all (cotton) farmers.9 In fact, maize production
is fundamentally linked to the food security needs of the family: farmers produce maize
and only when the food needs are secured do they consider growing cotton. Table 5, which
reports the percentage of households that grow maize, provides evidence supporting this. We
show that in the cotton provinces, maize is grown by virtually all households. Participation
in maize production is always above 90% in the relevant regions, and, in the Eastern and
Lusaka provinces, the percentage of maize producers is nearly 100%. Table 6 reports evidence
that further supports our dierencing strategy. We report the percentage of farmers that
grow maize, conditional on being cotton growers. These shares are nearly 100% in the three
main cotton-growing provinces.
There are two additional identication assumptions that we can check. First,
our approach assumes that the agricultural eects, It, aect cotton and maize yields
proportionately (due to the logarithmic specication). In other words, the agricultural eects
are assumed to have the same eect on the growth of cotton and maize output per hectare
so that we can use the trend in maize yields to predict the counterfactual cotton yields
in the absence of the reforms. To support this assumption, we can compare the growth
rate in maize with growth rates in other crops because, under the maintained hypothesis,
these trends should be similar across crops. Figure 1 supports this argument. Each panel
compares the trend in yields per hectare in maize (solid line) with the trend in alternative
crops like sorghum, millet, sunower, groundnuts, and mixed beans (broken line). We observe
that, with the sole exception of groundnuts in 2001, the trends in all these crops are very
similar. In the regression analysis, we use maize as control because, unlike the other crops,
all households produce it.
9A key characteristic of cotton farming in Zambia is its scale: cotton is grown by smallholders, family
farms endowed with small farms, usually smaller than four hectares and with an average size of around 2
hectares.In addition, under the maintained hypothesis, we should observe similar trends in cotton
and maize in Zambia before the marketing reforms of 1994 and we should also observe similar
trends in neighbor countries like Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique|that are likely to be
similar to the cotton regions in Zambia. Figure 2 displays these trends. We report data
taken from FAOStat for the period 1985-1995 so as to present some historical data before
the agricultural liberalization that took place in Africa in mid-1990s. It can be seen that the
growth rate of cotton and maize yields are quite similar, especially in Zambia, Malawi and
Zimbabwe.
The other identifying assumption of our model is that the cotton reforms did not aect
maize yields. Theoretically, these reforms could aect output in all crops via spillovers in
resource allocation (labor, eort, fertilizers, pesticides), wealth eects, capital accumulation
and credit and nancial constraints. To the extent that the regression includes farm
characteristics like labor availability, agricultural tools, and land allocation, these spillovers
will be partially accounted for. But since x cannot account for spillovers in input quality or
eort, it is thus plausible for 1 and 2 to capture a mixture of impacts on cotton and maize
yields. There is a simple way to rule this out: if the reforms did not aect maize yields, then
the trends in yields in `reform' provinces (i.e., provinces where cotton is grown) should be
similar to trends in `non-reform' provinces (i.e., provinces where cotton is not grown). These
trends are plotted in Fig. 3. The solid line corresponds to the trend in maize productivity
in reform provinces and the broken line, to the trend in non-reform provinces. It can be
seen that these trends are indeed comparable across the whole period (except for 2002).
Even if it is not possible to entirely rule out the spillover eects from the cotton reforms to
maize farming, Fig. 3 strongly suggests that these spillover eects will be fairly small in our
analysis.
Finally, our strategy requires that the only shock to cotton captured by F1 and F2 be
the marketing reform. One possible confounding cotton-specic shock would be changes in
international prices; these prices are, however, already controlled for in our regressions. In
the available reviews of agriculture in Zambia during this period, there is no evidence of
other relevant shocks to cotton, except for the marketing reforms that we are investigating.3.2.2 Entry and Exit in Cotton Farming
The cotton specic eects ht, which include the suitability of the land for cotton production
and unobserved know-how in cotton husbandry, raise additional concerns. Omitting  may
induce correlation between some variables in the vector x and the error term in the model.
The choice of inputs, such as labor or pesticide use, depends on  (so that unobserved
productivity may be correlated with input use). The estimates of the impacts of the reforms,
1 and 2 will also be biased. The unobserved heterogeneity in  leads to dierent entry-exit
decisions in cotton farming, which in turn alters the composition of the group of farmers
that produce cotton in each of the reform phases. This compositional bias, which has been
extensively studied in industrial productivity analysis (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Pavcnik,
2002), can be xed by modeling entry and exit.
With xed costs in cotton production, cotton will only be protable if productivity is
high enough. As a result, there will be a cut-o (which depends on prices, market conditions,
infrastructure) such that farmers with productivity above this cut-o will enter the market
and farmers below the cut-o will not enter (or exit, if they were in the market already).
When the reforms increase the protability of cotton, for instance, lower productivity farmers
may be able to enter the market. Failure to control for this may lead to inconsistently lower
estimates of average yields at the farm level, thus leading to a downward bias in the estimates
of the (positive) impacts of the reforms. In contrast, in periods of induced exit, farmers
with lower unobserved productivity will be more likely to abandon cotton production. In
consequence, measures of average cotton yields that do not control for these dynamic eects
may be articially high, thus leading to downward biases in the estimates of the (negative)
impacts of the reforms.
Figure 4 claries these dynamics. The graph shows relative cotton productivity y as
a function of unobserved cotton-specic eects |for simplicity of exposition we assume
that the exogenous part of x is the same for all farmers and that the only dierence across
farmers is given by . Yields, or land productivity, are increasing in  since better land
quality or higher cotton skills lead to higher output (for a given usage of other inputs). The
line denoted y0 represents the cotton yields function before the reform. The horizontal lineat y denotes the cut-o, which, for simplicity, does not vary with the reforms. It follows that
we can determine a cut-o for the unobservables, denoted . The average yield before the
reform is, say, E(y0), the average of y conditional on  > .
Consider the eects of the failure of the outgrower scheme. If yields are negatively
aected, the yields curve shifts down to y1. Assuming a xed output cut-o y, the cut-o for
the unobservables increases to 
0
.10 This induces the `exit' of those farmers with relatively
low levels of , between 
0
and . Average yield, conditional on participation, drops to
E(y1). However, the decline in individual yields is larger. The right quantity is the average
productivity, computed along the curve y1, and integrating over values of  above the cuto
before the reform, . This is given by E(yr). The empirical model in equation (3) estimates
a change in average yields given by E(y0)   E(y1) which is a downward biased estimate of
the true eects at the farm level, given by E(y0)   E(yr). To correct these estimates, we
need to account for the role of unobserved cotton eects.
Our solution to this problem is to construct proxies for the unobserved cotton-specic
eects . Our method exploits the idea that since households with high  are more productive
in cotton, they are also more likely to devote a larger share of their land to cotton production.
This means that we could use land cotton shares as a proxy for the unobservable ht in (3).
A good proxy needs to be a good predictor of . Since, in practice, cotton shares
depend on various covariates besides cotton-specic eects that also aect yields (e.g., family
characteristics), we need to purge these shares of the part explained by observed determinants
of cotton choices. To accomplish this, our proxy for  is the residual from a model of cotton
land shares. Conceptually similar ideas have been adopted by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1987),
on fertility, and Pitt et al. (1990), in the health literature.






htt + vht; (4)
where z is a vector of regressors. We estimate the model with OLS and Tobit methods
(to account for the left-censoring of ac
ht at zero). In z, we include all the regressors in the
10Allowing for y to change after the reforms leaves our intuition unchanged.vector x of the cotton yield model (3), but we exclude pesticide and fertilizer use (basal,
top-dressing) because these are variable inputs and are thus a direct determinant of yields
but not of crop choice. Notice, however, that the purpose of this assumption is to avoid
achieving identication only from functional forms (non-linearities) in the Tobit models, but
that it is not a critical piece of our model. We experiment with three proxies e :
e ht =
8
> > > <


















The rst and second proxies are just the residuals of OLS and Tobit regressions of ac
ht on
zht, respectively. In these cases, the proxy e  enter linearly into (3). In the third experiment,












htb tobit) +e ht: (6)
To estimate (6), we use a partially linear model (Robinson, 1988).
Before turning to the results, we should mention three methodological issues. First, since
we use data on all households to estimate (4), this model does not suer from compositional
biases. Second, the allocation of land to cotton depends on the reforms as well as on aggregate
agricultural eects and international prices. However, a specication of (4) that that includes
z, F1, F2, It is not identied. In addition, since the maize share equation contains essentially
the same information as the cotton share equation, the dierencing strategy used in the yields
model will not work in the shares model. This means that we will not be able to identify
the eects of the reforms on land allocation, but we will be able to control eectively for 
in the yields model.11 Finally, e  may be an imperfect proxy for  if there are unobservables
in the share equation that also aect yields. We address this issue below.
11In practice, to improve the quality of our proxy, we estimate a dierent regression function for cotton
shares in each of the six years from 1997 to 2002. Notice that b  and gt are indexed by t in (5).4 Results
Our benchmark results are reported in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates
of equation (1), that is, a simple model of yields per hectare that does not control for
unobservables such as It, ht and ht. In these regressions, we use data from the three main
cotton provinces, the Central, the Eastern, and the Southern provinces.
We begin by briey discussing the main results regarding the observed covariates in
x. We nd that small farms are more productive in cotton (the variable `farm type' is a
dummy equal to 1 for large farmers). There is also evidence in favor of decreasing returns
to scale in cotton since there is a negative association between the size of land allocated to
cotton and cotton yields. In addition, households with male heads and households with large
families are more productive in cotton. Assets (such as ploughs or livestock) are positively
associated with yields. The eects of inputs such as basal and top-dressing fertilizers (which
are utilized in maize cultivation rather than in cotton) are not as strong as expected. Note
that our controls for inputs (labor, fertilizers) are imperfect and should thus be interpreted
as controls for farm characteristics. In these regressions, we include the international price
(relative to the district price of maize). Prices have a positive impact on yields.
The dynamics of cotton yields are closely linked to the dynamics in market structure:
compared to the introductory phase, yields are lower in the failure phase and higher in the
success phase. In this simple model of cotton yields, yields per hectare declined by 11.3%
(column 2) in the failure phase, and increased by 14.1% during the success phase.
Columns (3) to (6) report results from equation (3), controlling for agricultural eects
It and unobserved heterogeneity ht. In (3) and (4), we include the international price of
cotton, while in (5) and (6), we instead use pre-planting cotton prices. Consider rst the
models that include international prices. The estimated impacts of the marketing reforms
are signicantly larger, especially during the failure phase. In this case, yields declined by
40.4% (column 4) instead of by 11.3% (column 2). There are two reasons for this large
dierence. First, there is a positive aggregate trend in agricultural yields (net of the eects
of covariates) from the introductory to the failure phase. Second, some of the components of
F1, such as eort, prices or technical advice, are correlated with ability or land quality ().In consequence, high-ability farmers or farmers with better land may be able to sustain high
yields even in the collapse of the outgrower scheme. If so, part of the eects of farming ability
or land quality that are captured by  are being attributed to F1 so that the estimate of 1 in
column (2) is biased down. The increase in yields during the success phase, after accounting
for aggregate agricultural eects and , was 18.1% (column 4), as opposed to 14.1% (column
2). These dierences are not statistically signicant. When comparing the failure and success
phases, however, our estimates indicate that cotton yields per hectare in fact increased by a
whopping 58.5%. Notice that these estimates take the introductory phase as the base period.
Since the introductory phase already showed improvement in performance with respect to
the pre-privatization period, the gains from the overall liberalization can be quite large.12
By including international cotton prices as regressors, we control for exogenous shocks to
cotton prices that may contaminate our estimates. Notice that this strategy assumes that
the pass-through rate from rms to farmers only changes as a result of the reforms. Under
this assumption, the eects of pass-through changes are embedded in 1 and 2. To explore
the opposite case in which the pass-through rate is not aected by the reforms but instead
responds to exogenous changes in international prices, we include the pre-planting cotton
price (announced each year by Dunavant) relative to the district maize price. Our results,
reported in Columns (5) and (6), remain essentially unchanged. This suggests that, while
in practice pass-through rates are likely to change in part due to the reforms and in part
due to changes in international prices, these dierences are not playing a major role in the
Zambian experience.
Why are these impacts so large and what do they mean? They are large because of two
main reasons. The dummies F1 and F2 that measure the phases of the reform comprise
various simultaneous channels, each contributing a bit to the overall gains. These channels
include net prices (input prices and product prices), credit prices (interest rates on loans),
input use like seeds, fertilizers, pesticides (both in quantity, quality), technical advice,
equipment use (sprayers, tractors), and eciency in input combination. More importantly,
12Note that our estimates could be contaminated by a reporting bias by farmers. This bias would be
generated by farmers who side-sell, thus strategically reporting lower production than they in fact achieved.
This would negatively bias estimates of yields during periods of credit crisis and positively bias the subsequent
increase.the reforms implied drastic changes in market conditions in a situation of extremely low
pre-reform yields. This indicates that farmers were producing well within the production
possibility frontier.13
Our results highlight the interaction between competition and the outgrower schemes in
improving performance among cotton smallholders. While contract farming is important
to interlock markets and allow farmers to participate in cotton production, a successful
enforcement of those contracts is needed (Greif, 1993). In the case of Zambia, a period of
unrestricted entry of rms and intermediaries during the failure phase encouraged cotton
side-selling and a subsequent collapse of the scheme. In part because of this, some of
the incumbent rms (Dunavant and Clark) devoted resources to improve and extend the
outgrower schemes|by developing, for instance, the Distributor Farmer System|and to
foment coordination and commitment among them|by adhering to the bag label system,
for instance|(Banerjee and Duo, 2000; McMillan and Woodru, 1999). Smallholder
performance, in the end, was signicantly improved, with implications for poverty alleviation
and food security. While our farm survey does not collect monetary information, it is
reasonable to expect large impacts on poverty following a doubling of yields in the success
phase (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009).
We turn now to the compositional eects induced by entry and exit into cotton farming.
In Table 8, we report the results with the entry and exit correction.14 Column (1) reproduces
the estimates from column (4) of Table 7, which does not include controls for . Columns
(2) and (5) use a Tobit model to estimate the selection equation, columns (3) and (6) use
a linear model, and columns (4) and (7) use the partially linear, Robinson (1988) model.
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 8 dier in the list of covariates: both models share the same
regressors, but Model 1 measures assets (harrows and ploughs) in monetary units and Model
13It is fairly common to nd large returns to capital (excluding risk) as well as productivity gains or losses
from economic policies in developing countries. In Ghana, Conley and Udry (2010) and Udry and Anagol
(2006) nd real returns ranging from 250 to 300% (in the adoption of new technology in pineapples) or from
30 to 50% (in food crops). Similarly, a survey by Banerjee and Duo (2005) reports returns to capital of
52% in rural India, 78.5% in rural Pakistan, 80-125% in Thailand, 80-100% in Bangladesh, and 34-68% in
Kenya and Zimbabwe. Finally, McKenzie and Woodru (2006) report returns to capital of 5-15% per month
in Mexico.
14To save space, we do not report the estimates of (4). See the working paper version for details.2 measures them in physical units. To account for the fact that the model includes an
estimated regressor, e , we estimate the standard errors with a bootstrap procedure with 100
repetitions. In each loop of the bootstrap, we estimate (4), recover e , and plug it in (3).
Accounting for the compositional eects associated with entry and exit does not
aect our qualitative conclusions: yields declined during the failure phase (1 is negative
and signicant) and increased during the success phase (2 is positive and signicant).
Furthermore, these results are robust to the selection model used to build the proxy for
, i.e., the linear model, the Tobit model or the Robinson model.
Compositional eects seem to matter more in periods of exit than of entry. In Table 8,
the estimates of 1 (the failure phase) range from 42.9% (column 2) to 44.8% (column 6),
which are larger than the decline of 40.4% in column (1). This means that although the
average aggregate output per hectare in the economy declined by 40.4%, the average output
of a typical cotton farm declined instead by 43-45 percent. In other words, yields are, on
average, 3 to 5% higher than what they would be had the most unproductive farmers (in
terms of ) not exited the market. These dierences, however, are not statistically signicant.
During the success phase, the control for  does not seem to aect the estimates of 2.
In all our specications in columns (2) to (7) of Table 8, the estimates of 2 are similar to
those from the model that does not correct for  (column 1 and Table 7). One possible
explanation is that entry is more costly than exit. When unobservables  are such that
cotton becomes unprotable, farmers may exit at no signicant cost. Instead, when cotton
becomes protable, there might still be impediments to entry. Qualication for an outgrower
contract is perhaps the major barrier to entry. If a farmer exited due to default, re-entry
may indeed be costly.
So far, we have assumed that e  is a good proxy for  in the sense that once e  is included in
the model there is no leftover correlation between x, F1 and F2, and . If this is not the case,
our proxy becomes an indicator and needs to be instrumented with another proxy/indicator.
In the absence of instruments, we can think about e  as an error-ridden variable, e  = (aht  
z0
ht) + uht, where u is measurement error (Altonji, 1986). In this setting, we can estimate
the model under dierent assumptions about the variance 2
u and safely ignore the problemif the estimates of the model are relatively insensitive to it. In Table 9, we report estimates
of 1, 2 from equation (3) under several dierent assumptions about 2
u, from 1 to 300
(cotton shares are measured in percentages, from 0 to 100). Clearly, our estimates of 1 and
2 remain largely unaected by the potential measurement error.
To end, we check the robustness of our results to the denition of the phases of the
reforms. The dynamics generated by the elimination of the marketing board are generally
complex, and it may be arbitrary to assign specic years to dierent phases. In consequence,
we re-estimate the model using two alternative denitions. First, we redene the failure
phase to include only the year 2000 (dummy denoted R1) thus moving the year 1999 to the
introductory phase. As shown in section 3, the drop in the share of land allocated to cotton
as well as cotton yields declined much more markedly in 2000 than in 1999. The success
phase still includes 2001 and 2002 (with dummy dened by R2). In our second redenition,
we measure the impacts of the reforms by including year dummies, thus allowing the eects
of the reforms to vary year by year.
Table 10 reports the results. In columns (1) to (3), we use Model 1 (measuring assets in
monetary units) in the estimation of ac
ht; in columns (4) to (6) we adopt instead Model 2
(assets in physical units). In both cases, we use Tobits in (4). Our qualitative conclusions
remain unaected. The collapse of the outgrower scheme led to a decline in yields in 2000
(of around 54% in both specications). Also, the success phase led to an increase in yields
of 18%. More detailed patterns can be discerned when we use year dummies to measure the
dierent phases of the reforms. Compared to 1997, we nd that cotton yields rst increased
in 1998 and declined in 1999, back to 1997 levels. We still nd a large decline in yields in
2000, of around 41%. During the success phase, yields followed an increasing trend: output
per hectare was 15.2% higher in 2001 than in 1997, and 43.3% higher in 2002.15
15We also assessed the robustness of the results to the inclusion of Lusaka growers in the sample. Since
in fact there are fewer cotton growers in Lusaka, the results are insensitive to this alternative sample. In
addition, we run dierent models for the three major cotton provinces. Results suggest stronger eects in
the Center and East than in the South.5 Conclusions
This paper investigated the dynamic impacts of marketing reforms in cotton on farm yields
in rural Zambia. The reforms originate in the elimination of the Zambia Cotton marketing
board in 1994. Typically, this type of privatization episodes not only have short-run eects
but also medium to long-run impacts through reallocation of incumbent rms, entry and
exit of rms, market creation and destruction (for inputs, outputs and credit), and contract
enforcement mechanisms (the outgrower schemes). While the available data do not span
the privatization period per se, we are able to explore the follow-up market dynamics of the
cotton reforms, especially the failure phase of 1999-2000 (characterized by the collapse of
the outgrower schemes) and the subsequent success phase of 2001-2002 (characterized by the
improvement in the outgrower schemes).
We found interesting dynamic eects of the marketing reforms. Compared to the
introductory phase of 1997-1998, the failure of the outgrower scheme caused farmers to
move back to subsistence and led to reductions in cotton yields of around 43-45%. The
improvement of the outgrower scheme in 2001-2002 reversed these trends: farmers allocated
more land to cotton, and yields per hectare increased by 18% (beyond the base period levels
of the introductory phase).
At least three lessons can be derived from our analysis. First, our ndings emphasize the
importance of exploring the medium-run impacts, on top of the more standard short-run costs
and benets, of the privatization of marketing boards in Africa. Second, the results generate
valuable evidence on how this type of marketing reforms aects yields at the farm level via
input and output prices, credit, input use, technical advice, information and technology, and
eciency. Third, these reforms can foment complex institutions and our work highlights the
role of market creation and contract enforcement in the process of economic development
and poverty reduction in rural areas in developing countries.Acknowledgements
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Post Harvest Survey
(sample sizes)
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 654 674 648 795 663 701
Eastern 1,225 1,197 1,255 1,437 1,248 1,292
Southern 895 828 835 961 835 850
Lusaka 246 252 243 244 185 182
Copperbelt 370 349 379 464 367 372
Luapula 803 775 799 869 760 761
Northern 1,211 1,190 1,348 1,551 1,293 1,376
Nwestern 409 423 429 543 435 431
Western 706 648 725 835 699 733
Total 6,519 6,336 6,661 7,699 6,485 6,698
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
Table 2
Percentage of Farmers Growing Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 24.6 22.6 16.6 10.3 14.7 20.2
Eastern 35.2 32.7 31.7 20.4 32.1 39.0
Southern 9.9 10.7 11.7 4.3 8.8 12.8
Lusaka 5.4 3.3 4.7 0.4 5.1 8.2
Copperbelt 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luapula 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Northern 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NWwestern 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Western 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total 11.0 10.4 9.4 5.4 9.0 11.6
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.Table 3
Fraction of Land Allocated to Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
a) All Farmers
Total 9.2 9.3 8.1 4.3 7.6 9.9
Central 12.1 10.7 6.7 3.5 6.3 8.5
Eastern 12.4 13.0 12.3 7.2 11.9 14.6
Southern 4.1 4.2 3.7 1.3 3.2 5.1
Lusaka 2.4 1.4 1.7 0.1 1.9 3.3
b) Cotton Farmers
Total 38.0 40.0 37.7 34.2 37.5 37.9
Central 44.6 43.7 37.8 32.4 40.5 39.1
Eastern 35.3 39.6 39.1 35.4 37.1 37.3
Southern 38.9 35.3 31.4 28.9 35.7 38.9
Lusaka 44.2 41.0 38.8 26.7 37.2 39.8
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
Table 4
Yields per Hectare in Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 6.18 6.53 6.38 6.21 6.44 6.39
Central 6.33 6.67 6.72 7.04 6.98 6.73
Eastern 6.14 6.45 6.28 6.07 6.32 6.32
Southern 6.09 6.65 6.40 5.56 6.57 6.23
Lusaka 6.00 6.40 6.43 6.40 5.51 6.57
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
The gures in the table are in logs (so that the dierence from one year
to the other is the percentage change in yields).Table 5
Percentage of Households that Grow Maize
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 90.2 92.2 93.5 94.3 94.0 93.2
Eastern 99.9 99.5 99.2 99.5 99.7 99.6
Southern 93.5 92.0 94.4 96.3 97.3 97.6
Lusaka 100.0 99.5 98.9 100.0 98.9 99.4
Copperbelt 96.7 94.3 90.9 93.5 93.5 93.6
Luapula 28.5 24.3 31.6 35.1 31.8 41.1
Northern 45.1 35.9 48.8 46.9 46.9 59.3
NWestern 75.7 65.9 71.9 66.7 80.7 77.7
Western 89.9 82.2 88.5 82.6 90.1 87.2
Total 76.2 72.1 76.1 76.2 77.7 80.7
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
Table 6
Percentage of Households that Grow Maize
Conditional on Growing Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 96.7 95.7 95.1 100.0 97.9 99.3
Eastern 100.0 98.4 98.7 99.7 99.5 100.0
Southern 97.6 90.5 96.8 97.4 93.1 92.4
Lusaka 100.0 100.0 88.9 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total 98.8 96.6 97.7 99.5 98.4 98.8
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.Table 7
Cotton Yields: Impacts of the Marketing Reforms
Baseline Regressions
Cotton Yields
Simple Model Controlling for I and 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of head 0:006 0:006 0:012 0:009 0.014 0.010
(0:006) (0:006) (0:008) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007)
Age squared  0:00008  0:00009  0:00014  0:00011  0:00016 {0.0001
(0:00006) (0:00006) (0:00008) (0:00007) (0:00007) (0.00007)
Male hh. head 0:126 0:129 0:081 0:077 0.092 0.087
(0:040) (0:040) (0:047) (0:047) (0:047) (0:046)
Family size 0:103 0:078  0:033 0:006  0:035 0.007
(0:031) (0:031) (0:037) (0:036) (0.036) (0.046)
Share of males  0:002  0:023  0:024  0:031  0:030 {0.034
(0:087) (0:086) (0:107) (0:105) (0.106) (0.104)
Farm type  0:102  0:056 0:127 0:069 0.124 0.058
(0:038) (0:039) (0:043) (0:044) (0:043) (0.043)
Size cotton plot  0:29  0:307
(0:023) (0:023)
Relative plot size  0:341  0:373  0:343 {0.376
(0:024) (0:025) (0:024) (0:024)
Livestock 0:137 0:095  0:048  0:053  0:063 -0.059
(0:032) (0:033) (0:038) (0:04) (0.038) (0.039)
Harrows  0:066  0:06  0:063
(0:046) (0:053) (0:053)
Ploughs 0:106 0:048 0:032
(0:019) (0:027) (0:026)
Basal fertilizer 0:082  0:68  0:705
(0:107) (0:261) (0:255)
Top-dressing fert. 0:075  0:658  0:617
(0:104) (0:289) (0:281)
Cotton price 0:18 0:206 0:303 0:322 0.113 0.063
(0:058) (0:058) (0:068) (0:066) (0:064) (0.062)
Constant 6:812 6:858 0:378 0:608  1:30 {0.936
(0:277) (0:274) (0:338) (0:331) (0:322) (0:314)
F1  0:101  0:113  0:436  0:404 {0.511 {0.467
(0:042) (0:042) (0:049) (0:048) (0:059) (0:058)
F2 0:106 0:141 0:144 0:181 0.158 0.190
(0:030) (0:031) (0:039) (0:039) (0:039) (0:039)
Observations 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418
R2 0:11 0:12 0:11 0:14 0.12 0.14
Note: F1 and F2 measure the dierent phases of the dynamics of the cotton marketing reforms. F1 is a dummy for 1999
and 2000 and captures the failure of the outgrower scheme; F2 is dummy for 2001 and 2002 and captures the success of the
outgrower scheme. See text for details.
Columns (1) and (2) correspond to a simple model of cotton yields|equation (1) in the text|without controls for aggregate
agricultural trends, It, or overall unobserved farm heterogeneity, ht. Columns (3) and (4) correspond to equation (3) and
control for I and , controlling for international cotton prices; Columns (5) and (6) use instead pre-planting cotton prices.
Robust standard errors within parenthesis. Statistical signicance: *, 10%; **, 5%; ***, 1%.Table 8
Cotton Yields: Impacts of the Marketing Reforms
Compositional Eects Due to Entry and Exit in Cotton Farming
Model 1 Model 2
Tobit OLS Robinson Tobit OLS Robinson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age of head 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:009
(0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:008) (0:007) (0:007) (0:008)
Age squared  0:0001  0:0001  0:0001  0:0001  0:0001  0:0001  0:0001
(0:00007) (0:00007) (0:00007) (0:00007) (0:00007) (0:00007) (0:00007)
Male hh. head 0:077 0:092 0:089 0:093 0:094 0:089 0:094
(0:047) (0:048) (0:047) (0:053) (0:048) (0:047) (0:053)
Family size 0:006 0:018 0:022 0:014 0:019 0:023 0:015
(0:036) (0:037 (0:037) (0:037) (0:037) (0:037) (0:037)
Share of males  0:031  0:022  0:025  0:023  0:021  0:025  0:023
(0:105) (0:105) (0:105) (0:102) (0:105) (0:105) (0:102)
Farm type 0:069 0:052 0:039 0:059 0:05 0:037 0:057
(0:044) (0:044) (0:044) (0:043) (0:044) (0:044) (0:043)
Relative plot size  0:373  0:398  0:522  0:398  0:401  0:524  0:40
(0:025) (0:030) (0:045) (0:028) (0:029) (0:044) (0:028)
Livestock  0:053  0:038  0:031  0:038  0:036  0:03  0:036
(0:04) (0:04) (0:04) (0:041) (0:041) (0:04) (0:041)
Harrows  0:06  0:054  0:053  0:053  0:055  0:06  0:053
(0:053) (0:053) (0:053) (0:048) (0:053) (0:053) (0:048)
Ploughs 0:048 0:053 0:054 0:053 0:053 0:053 0:053
(0:027) (0:027) (0:027) (0:022) (0:027) (0:027) (0:022)
Basal fertilizer  0:68  0:667  0:644  0:668  0:665  0:642  0:666
(0:261) (0:260) (0:258) (0:255) (0:260) (0:258) (0:255)
Top-dressing fert.  0:658  0:648  0:646  0:653  0:647  0:647  0:652
(0:289) (0:287) (0:284) (0:281) (0:286) (0:284) (0:280)
Cotton price 0:322 0:343 0:352 0:342 0:345 0:351 0:344
(0:066) (0:066) (0:066) (0:066) (0:066) (0:066) (0:065)
F1  0:404  0:429  0:447  0:432  0:431  0:448  0:434
(0:048) (0:050) (0:049) (0:050) (0:050) (0:049) (0:050)
F2 0:181 0:178 0:182 0:178 0:178 0:181 0:177
(0:039) (0:039) (0:039) (0:040) (0:039) (0:039) (0:040)
 0:001 0:008   0:002 0:008  
(0:001) (0:002)   (0:001) (0:002)  
Observations 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418
R2 0:14 0:14 0:15 0:15 0:14 0:15 0:15
Note: The table reports results on the role of entry and exit into cotton farming on average farm cotton yields. Column (1)
reproduces the baseline results from Table 7 (column 4), without accounting for unobserved cotton eects, . Tobit, OLS,
and partially linear (Robinson) refer to the dierent procedures used to estimate the cotton share model to derive proxies for
. See text. F1 and F2 measure the dierent phases of the dynamics of the cotton marketing reforms. F1 is a dummy for
1999 and 2000 and captures the failure of the outgrower scheme; F2 is dummy for 2001 and 2002 and captures the success of
the outgrower scheme. See text for details.
Models 1 and 2 correspond to two dierent rst stage models of cotton shares. Model 1 includes (in the rst stage) total
land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for male-headed farms, the proportion of males in the family,
a dummy for livestock rasing households, and assets (harrows, ploughs) in monetary units. Model 2 replaces assets (harrows
and ploughs) in monetary units for assets in physical units.
Standard errors are bootstrapped (to account for the estimation of ). Statistical signicance: *, 10%; **, 5%; ***, 1%.Table 9
Additional Unobservables in the Selection Model




1 4 9 16 25 36
F1  0:429  0:429  0:429  0:430  0:430  0:431  0:431
F2 0:178 0:178 0:178 0:178 0:178 0:178 0:178
 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:002 0:002 0:002
49 64 81 100 200 300
F1  0:432  0:434  0:435  0:437  0:451  0:487
F2 0:178 0:178 0:178 0:178 0:176 0:173
 0:002 0:002 0:002 0:002 0:003 0:005
Note: Estimates impacts of the reforms under dierent assumptions about the variance of the
measurement error, 2
u, in the cotton shares equation aht = z0
htt + ht + uht. Notice that
cotton shares are dened on [0,100). The cotton shares equation is estimated with a Tobit
regression model (based on Model 1 from Table 8).Table 10
Cotton Yields: Impacts of the Marketing Reforms
Sensitivity to the Denition of the Reform
Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 0:001 0:003 0:003 0:002 0:003 0:003









Dummy 1998 0:303 0:302
(0:058) (0:058)
Dummy 1999  0:147  0:147
(0:103) (0:103)
Dummy 2000  0:411  0:415
(0:068) (0:069)
Dummy 2001 0:152 0:15
(0:061) (0:061)
Dummy 2002 0:433 0:432
(0:057) (0:057)
Observations 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418
R2 0:14 0:15 0:16 0:14 0:15 0:16
Note: The table reports the impacts of the reform based on dierent denitions of its phases. Denition 1: F1 is a
dummy for 1999 and 2000 and captures the failure of the outgrower scheme; F2 is dummy for 2001 and 2002 and
captures the success of the outgrower scheme. Denition 2: R1 captures the failure of the outgrower contract scheme
with a dummy for 2000 (while 1999 is included in the introductory phase); R2 includes 2001 and 2002 as before.
Denition 3: each year from 1998 to 2002 is allowed to have dierent impacts on cotton yields.  is the measure of
unobserved cotton specic eects proxied by the residuals from the cotton shares model. In these results, the cotton
shares model is estimated with a Tobit procedure.
Models 1 and 2 correspond to two dierent rst stage models of cotton shares. Model 1 includes (in the rst stage)
total land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for male-headed farms, the proportion of males
in the family, a dummy for livestock rasing households, and assets (harrows, ploughs) in monetary units. Model 2
replaces assets (harrows and ploughs) in monetary units for assets in physical units.








































Note: The graphs compare the trend in maize productivity with the trends in productivity in alternative
crops. Starting at the top-left, the panels represent the cases of Mixed Beans, Millet, Sorghum, Sunower,
and Groundnuts, respectively. In each panel, the solid line represents the trends in maize productivity and
the broken line, the trend in the productivity in the alternative crops.Fig. 2 Cotton and Maize Yields in Africa: Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique
Note: Authors' calculations based on FAO database (FAOSTAT). The graphs depict the overall trends in cotton and
maize in Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The variables represent the log of output so that dierences
from one year to another is the growth rate.Fig. 3 Trends in Maize Productivity: Reform Provinces versus Non-Reform Provinces
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Note: The graph reports the trends in maize productivity in reform provinces (solid line) and non-reform
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